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We examine the role of ill-health in retirement decisions in Britain, using the first eight 
waves of the British Household Panel Survey (1991-98). As self-reported health status 
is likely to be endogenous to the retirement decision, we instrument self-reported health 
by a constructed ‘health stock’ measure using a set of health indicator variables and 
personal characteristics, as suggested by Bound et al (1999). Using both linear and 
non-linear fixed effects estimators, we show that adverse individual health shocks are 
an important predictor of individual retirement behaviour. We compare the impact of 
our constructed health measure on economic activity with that arising from the use of 
other health variables in the data set. We also examine the impact of the 1995 reform of 
disability benefits on the retirement decision. 
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Executive Summary 
This paper examines the role of ill-health in retirement decisions in Britain, using 
the first eight waves of the British Household Panel Survey (1991-98). To tackle the 
problem that self-reported health status is likely to be endogenous to the retirement 
decision, a two-stage method, as suggested by Bound et al (1999), is adopted. The first 
stage is to construct a ‘health stock’ measure that is cleansed of the effects of reporting 
behaviour reflecting labour market participation. This measure is then introduced into a 
reduced form model of labour market (in)activity. At this latter stage, modelling how 
labour market transitions are related to time variation in health and other characteristics, 
helps to eliminate any unchanging person-specific association between characteristics and 
the decision to work.  
The ‘health-stock’ measure is constructed by regressing self-reported health on a 
set of more objective health indicator variables and a set of other personal characteristics. 
Few personal characteristics, other than those related to health, are found to be 
significant in explaining self-assessed health. Many of the health indicators are significant 
in the model, and as expected having health problems is associated with reporting poor 
health. 
The panel structure of the data set is exploited to estimate a non-linear ‘fixed-
effects’ model that allows an exploration of how time variation in various characteristics 
relates to transitions out of (and in to) work. Deterioration in an individual’s health is 
found to be strongly positively associated with movement out of work. Sensitivity 
analyses suggest that there may be some asymmetry between the respective effects of 
health deteriorations and improvements on transitions out of, and in to, work. 
The final section briefly considers a reform to the public disability insurance 
programme in 1995, which both tightened formal eligibility conditions and reduced the 
economic incentives to retire via the disability insurance ‘route’. No significant effects are 
found. This may reflect that there indeed were no effects (a result that is not incompatible 
with the aggregate data), or it may reflect the weakness of the test that could be 
constructed given the framework and data used.  
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Ill-health and retirement in Britain: 
A panel data-based analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
The number of people on disability benefits more than doubled between the late 
1970s and the middle of the 1990s in Britain. ‘Ill health’ is a major reason for retirement 
among men, especially for men without access to an occupation pension (Tanner, 1998, 
Table 7). Indeed ‘own ill health’ is the most commonly cited reason for retirement 
among both men and women in the early 1990s (Disney, Grundy and Johnson, 1997, 
Table 2.19). Similar trends have been observed in other countries such as the 
Netherlands and the United States (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). 
There is a strong correlation between observing a person not working and their 
self-reported poor health status, but this may give a misleading impression of the impact 
of health status on retirement. First, individuals who are inactive often have an incentive, 
for self-esteem if nothing else, to report worse-than-actual health. Second, differences in 
reported self-assessed health are large, even for individuals in identical labour market 
states – individual heterogeneity is important. Third, individuals with genuine ill-health 
may never have worked, so they cannot be observed ‘retiring’. Fourth, genuine ill-health 
may impact on other labour market attributes of the worker (for example, the wage they 
earn – see Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997) which implies that there are both income and 
substitution effects on labour supply arising from shocks to the worker’s health status. 
Finally, the health stock may be endogenous to the labour market state of the individual 
(Kerkhofs, Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1999). 
The potential measurement error and endogeneity of self-reported health status 
has led some writers to reject the use of self-reported health status (Myers, 1982) even 
though it has been, and continues to be, commonly used in this field for want of better 
measures.
1 A further problem is that, in the UK at least, for those individuals with no 
occupational pension rights, disability benefits are the only ‘route’ into early retirement 
through the social security programme, since the social security pension cannot be 
                                                 
1  For a survey of US evidence that uses self-reported measures, see Quinn, Burkhauser and Myers 
(1990). There are relatively few studies of retirement behaviour in the United Kingdom. Zabalza, 
Pissarides and Barton (1980) use self-reported ‘poor health’, Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) use self-
reported ‘health problems’ as their proxy for ill health and Miniaci and Stancanelli (1998) use ‘ill 
health as a reason for leaving last job’ in modelling the ill health-retirement ‘route’. Blundell, Meghir 
and Smith (2002) is described below.    3
received before the state pension age (currently 65 for men and 60 for women). 
Consequently, there is an inducement for early retirees to utilise the ill-health route and 
their self-assessed health status will correlate with preferences for early retirement 
(Blundell and Johnson, 1998).
2  
For the researcher interested in the link between ill health and retirement, one 
obvious strategy is to substitute more objective measures of ill health (if available) for 
self-reported health status in the model ‘explaining’ retirement.
3 Some studies have 
argued for the intrinsic superiority of this approach, since it eliminates the errors-in-
variables and biases arising from the subjective health measure (many such studies are 
cited in Quinn, Burkhauser and Myers, 1990). But, Bound (1991) points out, we cannot 
be sure that such proxies are any better predictors of (in)activity than self-reported health 
status, as the researcher implicitly thereby assumes some link between work status and 
these other health measures.
4 Such a strategy does not eliminate the errors-in-variables 
problem but replaces it with a similar problem on a proxy variable, and may thereby lose 
any additional information on the ‘true’ association between health and behaviour that 
might be intrinsic to the self-reported ‘subjective’ measure.
5  
Another pertinent suggestion, explored by Anderson, Burkhauser and Quinn 
(1986) and Bound, Schoenbaum, Stinebrickner and Waidmann (1999) (hereafter Bound et 
al) is that changes in labour market status e.g. ‘retirement’ (whether permanent or 
temporary) should be associated with ‘shocks’ to the individual’s underlying ‘health 
stock’. Bound et al’s strategy is to construct a latent health stock or index of health for 
each individual as a function of personal characteristics and health indicators. This 
constructed variable can be used to instrument self-reported health in a panel data model 
of economic activity in order to explore the relationship between time variation in health 
and changes in work status (see also Stern, 1989). Modelling health ‘shocks’, it can be 
argued, eliminates any person-specific association between characteristics and labour 
                                                 
2  Of course, receipt of disability benefit is also conditioned on various ‘objective’ health assessments 
and work capability tests. These have changed over time – for further discussion see Disney, 
Emmerson, Smith and Smith (2002). 
3  This ‘objective’ measures may also be self-reported, or externally assessed by the interviewer or by 
some form of medical examination. In the UK context again, Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002), in 
their model of the impact of pension incentives on retirement, use a disability ‘severity score’ 
calculated from various ‘objective’ measures of self-reported disability, and also estimate an auxiliary 
reduced form probit for receipt of Invalidity Benefit. 
4  For example, construction of a disability ‘score’ such as the well known Disability Living Index may 
not primarily be motivated by attempts to measure the employment capacity of the individual.   4
market outcomes (such as preferences for work, or longstanding disability), whilst 
proxying self-reported health status by time-varying health and personal characteristics 
should ameliorate any reporting bias in the former. 
This paper follows the strategy suggested by these authors. It exploits the panel 
element of the data set to construct individual ‘health stocks’, and uses time variation in 
these ‘stocks’ as an explanatory variable in reduced form models of labour market 
(in)activity amongst older people. These labour market outcomes are modelled using 
linear and non-linear fixed effects estimator. We also experimented with other indicators 
of health-related retirement, including applying a similar modelling technique to a 
question concerning work-limiting health, as well as direct input of the more objective 
health measures that we describe shortly. We test for symmetry in the relationship of 
labour market transitions to improving and worsening health. We do not, in this paper, 
explore the ‘feedback’ of labour market activity or inactivity on the evolving health stock. 
We also examine the regime change in 1995, which replaced Invalidity Benefit by 
Incapacity Benefit, tightened some eligibility conditions and cut real benefits. In 
principle, this policy change strengthened the link between ‘true’ work-related disability 
and inactivity, so that we might observe a change in the health stock-economic activity 
relationship around this time. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of 
our health stock variable. Section 3 uses this variable as an instrument for health status in 
a reduced form labour market (in)activity model. Section 4 describes our sensitivity 
analysis to alternative health measures, asymmetries in the health-economic activity 
relationship, and possible omitted variables. It also reports our attempts to model the 
change in the disability benefit regime. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Modelling the individual’s health stock 
 
2.1 Data and modelling issues 
 
To construct an individual’s underlying ‘health stock’, we follow Bound et al 
(1999). Assume that the i
th individual’s health at time t is determined by a linear 
combination of exogenous personal characteristics (such as age and education) xit, a 
                                                                                                                                            
5  There is some evidence, for example, that self-reported health status is an additional predictor of 
individual mortality after controlling for observables (Kaplan and Camacho, 1983; Wannamethe and 
Shaper, 1991).   5
vector of detailed personal health indicators (such as functional limitations) zit and 
unobservables  υit uncorrelated with xit and zit. We allow the impact of these 
characteristics to vary over time. Denote this (unobserved) health state as ηit. So: 
it it t it t it xz η βγ υ ′′ =+ +            ( 1 )  
Although this health state is not observed, a self-reported health status is 
observed in our data, as a categorical variable with five ‘states’: ‘excellent’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, 
‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ (the exact form of the question is discussed below). Denote this 
categorical variable as hit. The latent counterpart to hit, which is denoted by h*it, is a simple 
function of ηit and a term reflecting reporting error: 
*it it it h η ε =+            ( 2 )  
Crucially, we assume that εit is uncorrelated with υit. Reporting error may well be 
correlated with the state in which the individual is located. By using this instrumental 
variable-type procedure, we are assuming that the errors are uncorrelated with those 
arising when reporting specific health limitations. Thus we write: 
*[ ]
*
it it t it t it it





′′ =+ + +
′′ =+ +
          ( 3 )  
Assuming that uit is normally distributed, equation (3) can be estimated as an ordered 
probit.  
  To reiterate, therefore: we construct this time varying individual ‘health stock’ to 
strip the health term in the labour force participation equation of possible endogeneity of 
response. Using self-reported health status, hit, as a proxy for ηit directly will be biased if 
the reporting error term in equation (2) is correlated with terms in the labour force 
participation equation that we estimate in the next section. However, simply entering the 
zit vector in equation (1) directly into a labour force participation equation will likely 
induce errors-in-variables biases, because more specific health factors, even if accurately 
reported, may not perfectly predict current capacity to work.
6 Using the latent variable 
model in equation (3), Bound et al (1999) argue, is a standard measure of dealing with 
these problems, by using a proxy with error to instrument an endogenous and error-
ridden variable such as h* (see also Griliches (1974)).  
                                                 
6  Bound (1991) illustrates these likely outcomes concerning h* and the use of ‘objective factors’, formally: 
see ibid pp.110-114.   6
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the first eight waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-98.
7 This survey provides a sample that was 
selected to be representative of the population of England, Wales and Scotland (south of 
the Caledonian Canal). Since we are interested in the retirement behaviour of older 
workers we use a subsample of people aged 50 to 64 in 1991 and who by the end of our 
sample period have reached ages 57 to 71. This selection by age, coupled with the 
requirement that we observe certain variables (particularly work status and health) leaves 
us with a sample of 1,712 individuals in 1991, reduced to 1,253 by 1998.  
One advantage of using this data is that it is a panel that allows us to track 
individuals over a relatively long period of time: our eight year panel is significantly 
longer than that available to Bound et al (1999), for example. The BHPS also records a 
rich set of characteristics for individuals in the sample. In what follows we use data on 
educational achievement, family composition, region of residence and a derived variable 
on housing wealth,
8 as the components of the xit vector, and the many measures of 
individual health that are contained in the survey as the components of the zit vector.  
What measures of health status are contained in the data set: i.e. the zit vector in 
equation (1)? Aside from recording whether or not the individual is registered disabled 
these come in two sets, the first recording whether or not individuals say that they have 
certain health problems and disabilities and the second recording whether or not 
individuals feel that their health limits their ability to perform certain daily activities. The 
health problems and disabilities that individuals are asked about are: problems with arms, 
legs, hands, feet, back or neck; difficulty seeing; difficulty hearing; skin conditions and 
allergies; chest or breathing problems including asthma and bronchitis; heart problems 
and blood pressure or circulation problems; stomach, liver, kidney or digestive problems; 
diabetes; anxiety, depression or bad nerves; alcohol or drug related problems; epilepsy; 
migraine or frequent headaches; other health problems. After being asked “does your 
health limit your daily activities compared to most people of your age?”, the specific 
activities that BHPS respondents are asked about are: doing the housework; climbing 
stairs; dressing oneself; walking for at least ten minutes.
9  
                                                 
7  The question relating to health status changed in the BHPS in 1999. 
8  Our thanks to Andrew Henley at University College, Aberystwyth for providing the results of his 
programme that models housing equity in the BHPS.  
9  The BHPS also contains a series of questions that contribute to a constructed index of “subjective 
well being”. These questions ask things like whether or not people feel that recently their concentration 
has been good, and whether or not they feel that recently they “have been playing a useful part in   7
As explained above, the specific indicators of health are used to cleanse the more 
subjective general assessment of health of response patterns that, we argued, might be 
correlated with work status. The general health measure hit is a response to the question: 
“Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. Compared to 
other people of your own age, would you say that your health on the whole has been: excellent; 
good; fair; poor; very poor; don’t know” (our italics).
10  
It is noteworthy that the self-reported health status variable that we use is derived 
from a question that specifically asks respondents to compare their own health to that of 
other people of their own age. The likely expected decline in health status as the panel of 
respondents ages should not therefore be picked up by the variable. It follows that, in our 
retirement model, we should interpret a significant coefficient on our constructed health 
variable as indicating that individual-specific variations in health have an impact on 
labour market activity. The cumulative effect on retirement decisions of the general 
deterioration of health with age should be picked up through other variables in the 
model, in particular by the age terms.  
Notwithstanding the relative nature of the health question, there does seem to be a 
general decline in self-assessed health relative to the cohort. This is seen from year-on-
year comparisons of the data. The overall effect can be seen by comparing the first and 
last years of data, presented in Table 1, where we differentiate between the whole sample 
in each year, and those who were present in both years:
11  
Table 1 here 
This, of course, provides another reason for being cautious about simply using 
the self-reported overall health measure in an analysis of economic (in)activity. The 
average decline in self-reported health relative to the cohort may arise from a change in 
self-perception, or a change in the comparison group implicitly used by the respondent 
                                                                                                                                            
things”. In total there are twelve such questions, but after some experimentation we decided not to use 
these variables as asking how people feel about themselves may be more subjective than the sets of 
questions about health problems and limitations on daily activities. 
10 Contoyiannis and Rice (2001) use this exact variable in their analysis of the impact of health on 
wages. When they use panel IV estimators, the impact of self-reported health status is not significant 
(ibid Tables 3 and 4) suggesting that measurement error (heterogeneity) dominates. Note that we allow 
for person specific effects at the second stage of our estimation procedure.  
11  The numbers decline due to sample attrition over the period of the panel, either through death or 
non-response. Note that biases due to the association of poor health and mortality should lead to an 
overestimate of the average health of the ageing cohort since subsequent responses are conditioned on 
survival. The smaller number in the second set of cells arises because some individuals observed in 
1998 failed to respond to all the health questions in 1991.   8
(who may be, for example, assessing only those people of similar ages who are still 




We now estimate the model for the latent ‘health stock’. Using as the dependent 
variable the categorical variable described above, Table 2 depicts the ordered probit 
underlying equation (3) for 1991. 
Table 2 here 
Looking at the sample characteristics, the first column of the table reveals that 
there are slightly more women than men in the initial sample. Almost four fifths of 
respondents are in a couple rather than single. The majority are owner occupiers, and 
almost 40% own outright. Housing equity is defined in thousand pounds. Almost half 
the sample have no educational qualifications, although there is wide variation. Of the 
sample, only 6% are registered disabled but significant proportions of the sample report 
having difficulties or health problems, notably with arms/legs/hands, lung or heart 
problems. 
Examining the parameter estimates, few personal characteristics, other than those 
related to health, are significant in explaining self-assessed health. Individuals in a couple 
and with higher housing equity are likely to report ‘better’ categorical health status; those 
without qualifications worse. The education variables are jointly significant with more 
highly educated people in general reporting better health. The regional dummies are 
jointly insignificant in explaining self-reported health status, although previous studies of 
the incidence of disability benefit receipt (such as Disney and Webb, 1991) show strong 
regional disparities, suggesting that regional labour market differences might be 
important in explaining economic inactivity. However it should be borne in mind again 
that the question invites the respondent to compare their health status with people of a 
similar age, which may be geographically-specific.  
In contrast to personal characteristics, and as expected, many of the health 
measures are individually significant at the one or five percent levels, and tests of joint 
significance show that the measures of functional limitations are very significant when 
considered together, as are the variables recording health conditions and problems.   9
Among these variables only ‘getting dressed’, ‘registered disabled’ and ‘hearing 
difficulties’ have an insignificant impact on self-reported health status.  
 It is would be desirable to provide some interpretation of the coefficients as 
‘marginal effects’. But it is well known that it is difficult to interpret the coefficients in an 
ordered discrete choice model like this ordered probit in this way.
12 A positive coefficient 
unambiguously means that an increase in the variable concerned will decrease the 
probability with which an individual is predicted to be in the lowest health category (very 
poor) and increase the probability with which they are predicted to be in excellent health, 
and vice versa. So the negative sign on coefficients on all of the health variables are (with 
the one exception of ‘hearing difficulties’) as we would expect. To get a feel for 
parameter estimates: if we take a representative individual who has the average (mean) 
values for characteristics measured by continuous variables and is assigned values of the 
dummy variable characteristics that are the most common in the data, then the predicted 
probability of being in excellent health if the person has no chest or breathing problems 
is 0.30. If they have chest problems it is only 0.07. 
The predicted values of the index for each individual from this equation 
constitute the individual ‘health stocks’ in 1991. We normalise these to give an absolute 
deviation of the individual’s health stock from the cohort average for each year. 
Normalising in this way avoids the need to make any further assumptions to identify the 
constant in each separate ordered probit. These predicted individual ‘health stocks’ for 
each successive year are then updated in the light of new information on the zit and xit 
vectors contained in the data. We update by running a new ordered probit for each year 
on same set of independent variables that are used in the first year. We predict the health 
stock index and normalise by subtracting the year specific mean, in the same way as 
described for the 1991 data. In this fashion, we construct an evolving health stock for 
each individual (relative to the year-on-year average for the sample) in the data set over 
the period 1991-98.
13 These are the latent health stock measures that will be introduced 
into the reduced form equations describing the evolution of each individual’s economic 
(in)activity. The descriptive statistics for these constructed health stocks, which are useful 
                                                 
12 See, Greene (2000, p.876ff.) or Wooldridge (2002, p. 504ff.).  
13 Results of the ordered probits for the years 1992-1998 can be obtained from the authors on request. 
Qualitatively they are similar to the results for 1991. 
   10
for interpreting coefficients in the models that follow, appear in an Appendix to the 
paper. 
  
3.  The impact of health on ‘retirement’ 
 
3.1  Theory 
 
 The economic theory underlying the relationship between ill-health and 
retirement is standard (for example, Lazear, 1986). Agents have preferences over current 
and future leisure, with the value of current and future leisure depending, inter alia, on 
current and expected states of health. Agents form expectations over future states of 
health. They maximise utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint, and standard 
dynamic optimisation conditions determine choice of retirement date, R*. Shocks to 
income, preferences, or both, will affect R*. There are various models of how people 
solve this optimisation problem.
14 There may be some institutional constraints that limit 
choice of R* but, in the United Kingdom, these are relatively few – participants can 
annuitise a private pension from age 50 and can both receive pensions and continue to 
work (for another employer) for as long as they like without a retirement test, at least 
since the abolition of the Earnings Rule in 1989 (Disney and Smith, 2002). 
Poorer health status, ceteris paribus, will reduce the probability of continued work 
for several reasons. First, poorer health may raise the current disutility of work. Second, 
poorer health reduces the return from work if there is a relationship between poor health 
and low wages. Third, poor health may entitle the individual to non-wage income, such 
as disability benefits, which is contingent on not being in work. The only counteracting 
principle is if poor health raises consumption requirements (for example, the cost of 
health treatment) and requires greater income than can be provided through the disability 
insurance programme. On the other hand, if poorer health is associated with lower life 
expectancy, the annualised consumption available from existing wealth is raised which 
might induce earlier retirement.  
In this framework, however, it is important to differentiate ‘levels’ of health from 
health ‘shocks’. As mentioned in the introduction, longstanding poor health may be 
                                                 
14  For example, individuals may notionally evaluate the utility from retirement now against all future 
prospective utility streams, including returns to work, as in a dynamic programming problem, or else 
evaluate retirement now against the highest valued stream from future retirement, assuming retirement is 
an absorbing state, as in the ‘option value’ model.   11
associated with a lower lifetime probability of work and thus, in extreme cases, 
retirement will not be observed simply because the individual never worked. Moreover, a 
slow decline in health status later in the working life may be anticipated and already 
incorporated into the optimal retirement strategy. Thus a measure of the time variation in 
the individual’s health ‘stock’, as constructed here, estimated over those that change 
status between activity and inactivity, should provide an appropriate test of the standard 
model. 
3.2 Estimation 
We now examine the role of the constructed health stock in a reduced form 
model of retirement. Here, we estimate a simplified version of the underlying model as 
described in equation (4) of the previous section. In the next section, a sensitivity analysis 
to the measure of the health stock is considered, as well as the impact of the 1995 change 
to the disability insurance regime.  
Since only the outcome is observed, a discrete choice model that incorporates 
dynamics (fixed effects) is appropriate. The fixed effects discrete choice model is: 
,      * 1.... , 1...
1  if  * 0, and 0 otherwise
it i it it it
it it
lf x i n t T
lf lf
α ηλ β ε ′ =+ + + = =
=>
     (4) 
where lf*it is the latent variable that indexes the probability of participation of individual i 
at time t, here defined as whether the individual reports that they are currently working 
(including self-employment), ηit is the unobserved health state,  it x′  is a vector of other 
characteristics and αi is the individual fixed effect. The fixed effects (conditional) logit 
model is written in general as: 
 
Pr( 1( , )
1
it it it
ii t i t
ii t i t
ax







    (missing bracket here)    (5) 
 
Chamberlain (1980) notes that the conditional likelihood function is free of the incidental 
(‘fixed effect’) parameters, αi. This is because a contribution to the likelihood only arises 
from those groups of observations (of a given individual over time, say) that are not 
always zero or one – in this case, those who transit ‘states’ between economic activity 
and inactivity.    12
The vector of explanatory variables for economic activity status comprises  ˆ
it h , 
which is the predicted value of the underlying health ‘stock’ ηit for the individual, relative 
to the average for each year, obtained from estimating equation (3) as described 















Table 3 illustrates the results of this exercise. 
Table 3 here 
Economic activity is related to age via a cubic and a dummy representing whether 
the individual is over state pension age or not.
15 Individuals in couples are less likely to 
work, as are individuals who own their home outright (although neither is significant at 
the 5% level in the preferred specification).
16 We interpret these characteristics as 
reducing the consumption requirements of households, and thus the probability of 
working. As would be expected, higher local unemployment rates are associated with a 
lower probability of economic activity. Of most interest, however, is the coefficient on 
                                                 
15  Since, since strictly speaking, health measures are relative to the cohort, the age effects should also be 
proxying the gradual cohort deterioration in health status, but the relationship between age and activity is 
not linear. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, individuals do not appear wholly to interpret the categorical 
health status question as a measure relative to their entire age group. 
16  In the fixed effects logit, we can also interpret this as saying that becoming married or cohabiting, and 
paying off a mortgage, increases the probability of retirement. This is also the interpretation to be put on 
the coefficients in the linear fixed effects model. 
Dependent variable: 1 if self-reported economically active (employed or 
self-employed), 0 otherwise. 
 
Age: a cubic in age 
 
SPA: if individual is aged at State Pension age or above = 65+ for men, 
60+ for women. 
 
Couple: if respondent is in a couple = 1 (default = single, widowed, 
divorced) 
 
Regional unemployment rate: the regional unemployment rate at t 
 
Owned outright = 1 if house is owned outright 
 
Health stock = Deviations of individual health stock measure from 
average at t as defined in Section 2   13
the individual’s relative health status, which is strongly positively associated with 
economic activity (a higher value indicating better health). This is an important result, 
bearing in mind that we are using a constructed variable proxying an assumed underlying 
health stock. Moreover, by focussing on individuals who change state, we have 
established the link between changing health status and retirement, as opposed simply to 
underlying (in)activity. 
The other specifications in Table 3 are for comparison. A simple logit without 
fixed effects but augmented with standard time invariant characteristics (column 2) gives 
a much stronger relationship of activity with health status (and correspondingly weaker 
age effects). These effects are identified off all individuals, including those who are active 
and inactive over the whole period, rather than simply those who transit states. The 
coefficients derived from the standard logit are mostly significantly different from those 
derived from the fixed effects logit and we prefer the latter since most other studies 
suggest that individual fixed effects are important in modelling retirement (as in Meghir 
and Whitehouse, 1997, and Blundell, Meghir and Smith, 2002).  
Column 3 provides the standard linear fixed effects estimator. This identifies 
effects off time-varying characteristics – such as marital status or home ownership – of 
all individuals. It gives similar results to column 1, and the coefficients are more easily 
interpretable than the conditional logit. However the linear model is an inappropriate 
choice when the variable of interest is dichotomous, as in the present case. Thus we 
prefer the specification in column 1. 
 
4. Sensitivity Analysis, and the 1995 reform 
 
4.1  Sensitivity to health measures and other variables 
We focus here on the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications, most 
particularly to using more specific measures of health status. We examine also whether 
the response of state transitions is symmetrical, especially in relation to the health 
variable. Finally, we look for evidence of a change in retirement behaviour as a result of 
the 1995 reform to the public disability insurance programme, which reduced eligibility 
for disability benefits and reduced the financial incentives to claim disability insurance 
benefit relative to other insurance benefits. Throughout the analysis, we evaluate 
alternatives relative to the results for the fixed effect logit in column (1) of Table 3.   14
First, we examine the inclusion of additional conditioning variables. We 
examined whether the impact of the health stock proxy on the probability of economic 
activity is different for men and women, by including an additional interaction of ‘health 
stock’ with a gender dummy. The inclusion of the extra variable is, however, easily 
rejected (χ
2 = 1.85, Prob > χ
2 = 0.17). We also examined whether partner’s health is an 
important predictor of changes in labour market status. Although there is the possibility 
that partner’s health status may also suffer from reporting bias, missing values mean that 
we would have to reduce sample size considerably if we were to follow the same 
procedure to construct a health stock for both the respondent and partner.
17 Even using 
the categorical self-reported variable for the partner introduces a number of missing 
observations. Nevertheless, including the partner’s self-reported status (classified by five 
possible outcomes as before) plus a dummy for missing values for partner’s health was 
insignificant (using a Likelihood Ratio test, χ
2 = 0.46, Prob > χ
2 = 0.80)  
Second, we tested whether the participation response of individuals to health 
shocks is symmetric – that is, whether improvements in health are associated with 
transitions into work in the same way that deteriorations are linked to movements out of 
work. Alternatively there may be a ‘ratchet’ effect such that after an individual’s poor 
health has caused exit from work, it requires health to recover beyond the threshold that 
induced exit in order to encourage new efforts to seek work.
18 However, given that the 
sample variable used, and the ‘health stock’ derived from it, measures an individual’s 
health relative to that of other people of a similar age, it is misleading to utilise it to 
evaluate the direction of change in that individual’s health status: a measured 
improvement may reflect that the health of the individual concerned has deteriorated by 
less than the average change across the whole sample. So, to carry out a test of symmetry, 
we utilised another variable in the data set, derived from the response to the question: 
‘Does your health limit the type of work or amount of work you can do?’ [YES/NO] 
Responses to this variable are of course likely to be strongly endogenous to labour 
market status, and it is of some interest to see whether our instrumental variable-type 
technique gives similar results on this variable. We interpret responding negatively to this 
question as reporting being in ‘good health’. We then use the same variable set as in 
                                                 
17 This is because many of the individuals in our sample have a partner who is not in the cohort used 
for this analysis. 
18  Thus, if retirement is always an ‘absorbing state’, then deteriorations in health will lead to retirement but 
improvements in health will not induce a return to work. In our data, there are roughly 3 times as many   15
Table 2 in order to obtain derived individual year-specific predictions of the probability 
of responding negatively to this question (results are available on request from the 
authors). Unlike in the ordered probit used previously, there is just one probability of this 
kind that can be predicted from this standard probit. Further, in this case an increase in 
this probability can be interpreted as meaning that health has improved and become less 
of a constraint on work. The predicted probabilities are inserted in the labour market 
(in)activity equation in the same way as was our more detailed ‘health stock’ measure. 
The results using this new predicted variable No health limit on work, analogous to 
Table 3, are contained in Table 4. Results are similar, but there is one additional variable. 
Since the probability of health affecting work is now measured as an ‘absolute’ 
probability, we introduce an interactive dummy capturing whether predicted health has 
improved or worsened.
19 The term Symmetric health impact is this dummy multiplied by 
the predicted health measure where the dummy takes the value 1 when the health 
measure has improved relative to the previous year. By adding this additional term, we 
have an indirect test of a positive ‘ratchet effect’ of ill health on the retirement 
probability. A significant negative coefficient on the interacted health term suggests that 
an improvement in health has a weaker impact on the probability of transiting from 
inactivity to activity than the reverse. And this is the result obtained, significant at 
between 1% and 3% depending on specification. Note, however, that the coefficient 
does not fully cancel out the health effect – the impact of improving health on the 
transition to economic activity is weaker, but present. 
Table 4 here 
We also investigate further sensitivity of the results to the measure of the health 
stock. As argued in Section 1, economic activity should be strongly correlated with 
subjective, work-related, measures of health status in part due to reporting bias. On the 
other hand, specific indicators of disability may have a weaker correlation with economic 
activity simply because there some of these disabilities may have relatively little impact on 
capacity to work. 
Table 5 provides coefficients and standard errors for our baseline specification of 
the ‘health stock’ variable and for directly input measures of health difficulties and 
                                                                                                                                            
moves ‘out’ of economic activity as there are ‘in’; moreover these moves ‘in’ are concentrated among a 
smaller number of multiple movers. 
19 Note that we require at least two observations to observe this change, so that the first observation of 
each respondent is absent. This is why the sample size is smaller in Table 4 than Table 3.   16
functional limitations without the instrumental variable-type approach used in Tables 3 
and 4. Column 1 gives the coefficient and standard error from the calculated measure 
used in Table 3, as a benchmark. 
Table 5 here 
Column 2 provides the coefficient on two count variables, which count up the 
number of difficulties in basic physical activities (j=1 to 4) and the number of reported 
health problems (n=1 to 13), as well as whether the individual is registered disabled, as 
reported by the individual. A higher count in each case should be associated with a 
greater number of functional limitations or incapacities and therefore with a greater 
probability of retirement, so these can be regarded as crude self-reported ‘disability 
indices’. It will be noted that the sign on the number of self-reported difficulties and, not 
surprisingly, being registered disabled, is negative. This is also true with the count of up 
to 13 ‘health problems’ but the latter, unlike the other variables, is not statistically 
significant.  
We can see why the count variable is insignificant in Column 3, which includes 
separately all the self-reported difficulties and health limitations that were utilised to 
construct the health stock measure in Table 3 and the count variables in Column 2 of 
Table 5. A negative sign is associated with a greater probability of inactivity. The first 
striking feature, which underpins the result in column 2, is that many self-reported health 
difficulties have the ‘wrong’ sign, in the sense that they are associated with economic 
activity, rather than predicting inactivity.  
By sequential restrictions, we can eliminate the insignificant regressors to arrive at 
a parsimonious specification of a model that enters the zit vector directly. This is 
contained in column 4 of Table 5. In so doing, it can be seen that the only ‘health 
difficulty’ that survives this simplifying process – reporting a diabetic condition - is 
positively associated with work status.
20 The other remaining variables: self-reported 
difficulties in walking and getting dressed, and registered disabled are all likely to be 
associated with severer disability.  
Overall, columns 2 to 4 suggest that the strategy of entering specific health 
problems and self-reported difficulties in basic physical activities into the retirement 
model is not particularly successful. It is of course possible that a proper objective (i.e.   17
measured by an impartial third party) indicator of functional limitations and/or 
incapacity is required to pin down the exact relationship between measures of physical 
and mental ill-health and retirement behaviour. However, the results suggest that the best 
way to introduce these more objective factors, given the data available, is through the 
two-stage process by which the combination of these, and other, factors generate 
underlying health stocks, measures of which are the key to explaining the link between 
health status and economic activity. 
 
4.2  Reform of the disability insurance programme 
 
In 1995, the government introduced a number of significant reforms to the 
public disability insurance programme. Invalidity Benefit (IVB), the main insurance 
benefit for those with chronic ill-health and disabilities, was to be phased out and 
replaced by Incapacity Benefit (ICB). ICB is not available to individuals over state 
pension age (men, 65 and women, 60) unlike IVB, which was available until men and 
women were respectively 70 and 65. As existing claimants reached 70 and 65, therefore, 
claims to IVB above state pension age would phase out. The reason that individuals 
might prefer to be on Invalidity Benefit rather the basic state retirement pension at state 
pension age was that the former was not liable to income tax, unlike the basic state 
pension. ICB is treated as taxable income. Finally, eligibility conditions to be accepted 
onto disability insurance were tightened up. Full details can be obtained in Disney et al 
(2003). The whole policy package was designed to arrest the rise in numbers of disability 
insurance recipients that had occurred since the 1970s, especially among older men. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trends in receipt of disability insurance benefits among 
older age groups, both men and women, from the early 1980s. After 1995, the number of 
male claimants falls sharply, but it is apparent that this is almost wholly due to phasing 
out claims in the age group above state pension age (65+). There is, however, a 
stabilisation in numbers for the age groups just below state pension age, relative to the 
rapid increase of the previous decade.
21 For women, in contrast, it is seems clear that the 
                                                                                                                                            
20  In this sample, almost all those reporting a diabetic condition are working at the start of the period, 
which is why the coefficient appears so large. 
21  One surmise is that the rapid rise in claimant numbers in the late 1980s is related to another institutional 
change – namely, government measures to target the long-term unemployed such as Restart. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Restart led to the transfer of significant number of unemployed 
claimants on to Invalidity Benefit. In which case, tapering out Restart, combined with the 1995 Act, may 
have led to a reversion to the earlier, slower, trend growth in claimant numbers. However this surmise 
requires further analysis.   18
1995 reform did nothing to abate the rise in the number of disability insurance claimants 
for those below state pension age. 
Figure 1 here 
In principle, the object of such a reform is to change the link between ill-health 
and retirement. The number of individuals retiring on grounds of ill-health should 
diminish, as a result of the tightening of eligibility conditions. Whether a priori this 
reduces the total number of retirements is unclear, as the reform changes the economic 
incentives to retire across different retirement ‘routes’. There are at least two implicit 
hypotheses that can tested in the present context. The first is that the 1995 legislation 
discouraged premature retirement (i.e. before state pension age). The second is that the 
link between retirement and ill-health was tightened as a result of the 1995 legislation so 
that, post-1995, the probability of a ‘shock’ of given intensity being associated with ill-
health has changed. This can be thought of as raising the threshold at which a health 
shock precipitates a change in the economic status of the individual. It should be borne 
in mind from Figure 1, that, apart from the exclusion of individuals post-state pension 
age, there is no evidence of a change in trend among women, and only evidence of a 
slowing down in the increase in numbers of disability benefit recipients among men. The 
likelihood of a ‘big’ effect of the 1995 Act is going to be limited in our analysis, even if 
we have an appropriate model and the correct indicators of the health-disability 
insurance link. 
To model the legislation we introduce two further variables into the basic 
retirement model. The basic hypothesis is that a given health shock will be associated 
with different behaviour after the tightening of eligibility requirements and reduced 
economic incentives post-1995. The first variable is a dummy variable that describes 
whether the individual is in the post-1995 Incapacity Benefit system, which requires that 
the individual is below state pension age after 1995 and not already in a spell of Invalidity 
Benefit. Since such individuals are no longer able to receive tax free Invalidity Benefit 
after state pension age, the present value of retiring through the disability ‘route’ is 
reduced. If eligibility conditions were effectively tightened, then people would also find it 
more difficult to move from work onto disability benefits after the reform. Our basic 
hypothesis therefore is that some people might stay in work longer in the new regime. 
The variable eligible ICB characterises this group of individuals. The second variable 
interacts this dummy with the calculated health stock, which we denote as   19
hstock*eligible ICB. The interpretation here is that the 1995 reform raised the 
threshold ‘shock’ to health required to enter the ICB regime, thus changing the health 
stock-retirement relationship.  
Table 6 presents the result for the two fixed effect specifications in Table 3, for 
the relevant variables: hstock, spa (state pension age or above), eligible ICB and 
hstock*eligible ICB (coefficients for the other controls are not reported here). As before, 
the health stock and state pension age variables are significant. The interaction between 
health stock and the post-1995 regime (hstock* eligible icb) is insignificant, suggesting 
that there may be no evidence of a break in the relationship between changes in the 
health stock and economic activity after 1995. The variable proxying eligibility post-1995 
(eligible ICB) is also positive but insignificant with bootstrapped standard errors. A test 
of the joint exclusion restriction for both additional variables is not rejected. These weak 
results may reflect either a weak, or indeed no, relationship, or the difficulty of finding 
suitable proxies for the 1995 reform within the existing modelling framework.  
Table 6 here 
 
5.   Conclusion 
This paper represents one of the first attempts to examine the impact of ill-health 
on retirement in some detail in the United Kingdom, using the British Household Panel 
Survey. The focus of the paper is on the nature of health measures that are utilised in 
reduced form retirement models of the type described here. It argues that reporting bias 
is intrinsic to self-reported measures of general health (especially, in questions that 
explicitly link health to economic activity status), but that there is a lack of ‘fit’ between 
objective measures of disability and functional limitations on the one hand and health as 
it relates to economic activity on the other. We therefore follow the approach of Bound 
et al (1999) in constructing an underlying ‘health stock’ of the individual, and in treating 
temporal variations in this measure as proxying individual-specific ‘health shocks’ that 
affect retirement behaviour. 
The paper shows that a constructed proxy variable of this type can explain 
transitions between economic activity and inactivity in a reduced form model that 
incorporates other time-varying covariates. Moreover, the approach seems superior, in 
terms of explanatory power, to the application of disability index-type health measures. 
The paper tested for symmetry in labour market transitions to changes in health, using   20
predictions on an alternative subjective measure of ill health. Some evidence of 
asymmetry was found. No systematic differences were found in the response of men and 
women to changes in the health stock. 
The final section briefly considered the reform to the public disability insurance 
programme in 1995, which both tightened formal eligibility conditions for disability 
insurance and also reduced the economic incentives to retire via the disability insurance 
‘route’. No significant effects were found. The failure to find a significant effect may 
reflect the possibility that there indeed was no effect (a result that is not incompatible 
with the aggregate data). Alternatively, it may reflect the weakness of the test in a reduced 
form framework that aggregates different retirement ‘routes’ into a single transition. This 
therefore suggests a strategy for future work – to identify separately the economic 
incentives attached to different retirement ‘routes’ in the UK (broadening the work of 
Blundell, Meghir and Smith, 2002) and to estimate a model that allows for greater choice 
of exit. It would also be useful to follow the path pursued by others, such as Kerkhof et 
al (1999), in handling the endogeneity of health status, and also in examining the impact 
of health status on the utility derived from different retirement routes – for example, the 
impact of health changes on prospective wages.  
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Table 1:  
Self-assessed health, relative to cohort, 1991 and 1998 
 
  Percentage of whole sample 
reporting relative health 
status as: 
Percentage of sample 
present in 1991 and 1998 
reporting relative health 
status as: 
  1991 1998 1991 1998 
Excellent  26.5 16.4 27.4 17.0 
Good  44.3 46.7 44.7 45.8 
Fair  19.0 24.7 19.4 25.2 
Poor  7.7 9.4 6.3 9.2 
Very  poor  2.6 2.8 2.2 2.9 
      
No. of observations  1,712 1,253 1,137 1,137 
 
  Source: constructed by the authors from successive waves of the BHPS   23
Table 2: Results of 1991 Ordered Probit estimating self–reported health 
status as a function of ‘objective’ health measures and individual characteristics 
Variable Mean  s.  deviation  Coefficient   Standard  error 
Male  0.472 0.499  –0.005   0.058 
In a couple  0.771 0.420  0.141 **  0.071 
Age/10  5.998 0.493  –55.152   43.652 
(Age/10) squared  36.218 5.932  9.436   7.693 
(Age/10) cubed  220.157 53.910  –0.534   0.451 
Owner-occupier  0.776 0.417  –0.070   0.080 
Own-outright  0.486 0.500  0.049   0.067 
Housing equity (£,‘000)  54.628 74.907  0.001 **  0.000 
Regional unemployment rate, %  7.421 2.031  –0.081   0.075 
White  0.976 0.154  0.013   0.170 
Number of children in household  0.063 0.320  –0.106   0.078 
Regional dummies:        
Live in conurbation  0.290 0.454  0.059   0.094 
South West  0.102 0.303  0.067   0.113 
East Midlands  0.078 0.268  0.032   0.139 
West Midlands  0.096 0.294  0.128   0.151 
North West  0.107 0.309  0.303   0.239 
Yorkshire/Humberside  0.087 0.282  0.150   0.197 
Rest of North  0.060 0.238  0.306   0.326 
Wales  0.059 0.235  0.145   0.248 
Scotland  0.077 0.267  0.279   0.264 
Education dummies:        
A-level (or equivalent)  0.074 0.262  –0.185   0.119 
O-level (or equivalent)  0.131 0.337  –0.084   0.100 
Low education  0.104 0.305  –0.123   0.108 
No qualifications  0.476 0.499  –0.357 ***  0.078 
Health ‘difficulties’:       
Doing housework  0.071 0.257  –0.659 ***  0.156 
Climbing stairs  0.091 0.287  –0.369 **  0.155 
Getting dressed  0.024 0.153  –0.378   0.221 
Walking 10mins  0.090 0.286  –0.762 ***  0.149 
Registered disabled  0.073 0.261  –0.128   0.134 
Health ‘problems’:       
Arms/legs/hands  0.403 0.491  –0.554 ***  0.061 
Sight  0.058 0.235  –0.374 ***  0.099 
Hearing  0.120 0.325  0.027   0.095 
Skin/allergies  0.089 0.285  –0.219 **  0.101 
Chest/breathing  0.133 0.339  –0.926 ***  0.093 
Heart/blood press.  0.245 0.430  –0.693 ***  0.071 
Stomach/digestion  0.084 0.277  –0.544 ***  0.110 
Diabetes  0.043 0.202  –0.933 ***  0.163 
Anxiety/depression  0.073 0.261  –0.656 ***  0.118 
Alcohol/drugs  0.003 0.058  –0.957 **  0.399 
Epilepsy  0.007 0.086  –0.662 **  0.308 
Migraine  0.076 0.264  –0.464 ***  0.104 
Other  0.054 0.227  –0.632 ***  0.120 
F-tests:     Chi-Squared    P-Value 
Regional dummies     2.83   0.971 
Education dummies     25.90 ***  0.000 
Health ‘difficulties’    151.06 ***  0.000 
Health ‘problems’    405.66 ***  0.000 
**:  significant at 5% level 
***: significant at 1% level 
     Number of obs = 1,712; Log likelihood = –1,774.5939; LR χ
2(42) = 965.75 
A full set of results from the other 7 years is available from the authors on request.  24
Table 3: 
Economic activity equations 
 
  (1) 




Linear fixed effects 
  Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Age/10  206.366*** 69.084  51.954**  20.882 15.097***  3.361 
(Age/10) squared  –34.913*** 11.546  –8.475**  3.511  –2.578***  0.558 
(Age/10) cubed    1.903***  0.640   0.441**  0.196   0.142***  0.031 
State pension age   –0.788***  0.268  –0.173**  0.084  –0.085***  0.018 
Couple    –0.654  0.568    0.288***  0.059   –0.036  0.031 
Regional unemployment rate   –0.088**  0.038    –0.006  0.014  –0.005**  0.002 
Own–outright    –0.387  0.275   –0.459***  0.058   –0.073***  0.020 
Health stock     0.279***  0.105    0.752***  0.031    0.035***  0.007 
Constant  n/a n/a  –102.052***  38.666  –27.993***  6.702 
           
No of cases  Obs=4,348  Groups=617  Obs=11,152  Obs=11,152  Groups=1,945 
Log likelihood  −1,109.98  −6,030.07 
R
2 within  0.1286 
Between   0.2133 
Overall    0.2024 
 
Note: ***= significant at 1% level  **=significant at 5% level *= significant at 10% level. 
The standard logit model also includes a set of regressors that are time-invariant, such as gender, 
educational qualifications and regional dummies, which are not included in either the conditional 
logit or the linear fixed effects model. These comprise all of the variables show in table 2 except 
for those relating to health difficulties, health problems and whether an individual is registered 
disabled (since they form the vector Zit in equation 1 in section 2.1). 
Due to the health stock being calculated from the predicted index of eight ordered probits the 
standard errors are estimated using a bootstrapping technique. 1,500 bootstraps for each 
equation have been run. In the conditional logit and the linear fixed effects model we select a 
random sample of individuals (and then select all observations for that individual), while in the 
logit model we select randomly across all observations (i.e. observations of the same individual in 
different years are selected separately). Due to some of the random draws leading to non-
convergence of the ordered probits the total number of bootstraps used in the calculation of the 
standard errors varies from 1,409 in the conditional logit and the linear fixed effects model to 
1,390 in the standard logit.   25
Table 4: 
Economic activity equations 
(Alternative health question) 
 
  (1) 




Linear fixed effects 
  Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.  Coeff.  s.e. 
Age/10  319.196***  61.904   98.833***    25.685  19.526***  3.152 
(Age/10) squared  –53.331*** 10.283 –16.093***  4.263  –3.364***  0.520 
(Age/10) cubed    2.894***   0.566    0.853***  0.235   0.185***  0.028 
State pension age   –0.976***   0.228   –0.238***  0.093  –0.101***  0.013 
Couple    –0.210   0.467    0.329***  0.067   –0.022  0.025 
Regional unemployment 
rate   –0.147**   0.058    –0.003  0.016   –0.005*  0.003 
Own–outright    –0.300   0.250   –0.444***  0.065   –0.059***  0.015 
No health limit on work    1.865***   0.397    2.695***  0.123   0.143***  0.022 
Symmetric health impact   −0.258**   0.123   −0.304*** 0.062  −0.022*** 0.008 
Constant  n/a n/a  –199.940***  51.427  –37.944***  5.990 
            
No of cases  Obs=3002  Groups=475  Obs=8,906  Obs=8,906  Groups=1,666 
Log likelihood  −782.16  −4,605.98 
R
2 within  0.1132 
Between   0.2424 
Overall    0.2163 
 
Note: ***= significant at 1% level  **=significant at 5% level *= significant at 10% level. 
The IV-type technique is applied to the question: ‘Does your health affect the type or amount of 
work that you undertake?’ [YES/NO]  
As in Table 3, standard errors are estimated using a bootstrapping technique. 1,500 bootstraps 
for each equation have been run. All random draws converged as the 1st stage estimation is a 
probit as opposed to the ordered probit used in table 3.   26
Table 5 
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Log likelihood  −1,109.98  −1,095.91  −1,079.19  −1,088.69 
Note:  Coefficients are illustrated for the fixed effect logit.   27
Table 6: 
Economic Activity equations  
pre- and post-1995 reform (selected coefficients) 
 
  (1) 
Fixed effects logit 
(3) 
Linear fixed effects 
  Coeff. s.e.  Coeff. s.e. 
State pension age    −0.67**   0.28   −0.08**   0.02 
Health stock     0.26**   0.11    0.03**   0.01 
Eligible ICB     0.27   0.21    0.01   0.02 
Hstock*eligible ICB     0.10   0.20    0.01   0.01 
      
Log likelihood  −1108.62 
Test to exclude ICB vars: 
χ2(2) = 2.69 Prob>χ2 = 0.26 
R2 within     0.1288 
   between   0.2125 
   overall    0.2023 
 
Note:  **=significant at 5% level  
 
As in Table 3, standard errors are estimated using a bootstrapping technique. 1,500 bootstraps 
for each equation have been run. Due to some of the random draws leading to non-convergence 
of the ordered probits the total number of bootstraps used in the calculation of the standard 






Numbers of claimants of Invalidity and Incapacity Benefit aged 50 




























Source: Banks et al (2002)   28
Appendix 









 Mean  (s.  d.) 
Health stock, those in work  –0.157 0.319  0.701    0.190  (0.695) 
Health stock, those not in work  –0.341 0.225  0.663    0.027  (0.886) 
  Health stock, all in baseline  –0.248  0.270  0.681    0.108  (0.801) 
           
  Change in health stock  –0.291  –0.005  0.257    –0.027  (0.555) 
  Difference between maximum 
and minimum health stock 
 0.679   0.992  1.391    1.100  (0.637) 
 
These ‘stocks’ are measured for the 617 individuals that make up the sample for our 
“baseline” fixed effects logit model. This gives 4,348 person year observations (2,148 for people 
who are in work and 2,200 for those who are out of work) and 3,558 observed first differences.  
Whilst our health stock variable is constructed to be mean zero across all person year 
observation in our full sample, we see that in the subset of the data that are used for estimating 
the fixed effects logit model the mean is slightly positive: the tail of unhealthy people who are 
dropped because they never work have health stocks that are sufficiently bad (on average) to 
more than offset the fact that some healthy people are dropped from the fixed effects logit 
because they work in every period. 
These data show that it is uncommon for the measured health stock of an individual to 
change by as much as one unit between one year and the next: 8 per cent (289 observations) of 
the year-on-year changes that we observe are of one unit of more in either direction (of these, 
170 are declines and 119 are increases). 
However, as the median in the last row of the table indicates, almost half (actually 49 per 
cent or 303 people) of the people in this sample have a maximum measured health stock that is 
one unit or more greater than their minimum measured health stock across all years.   
 